From free-riding to collective action in wildfire mitigation: The role of policy incentives

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Homeowners’ mitigation efforts are crucial for wildfire risk reduction in the Wildland-Urban Interface (WUI). However, participation in mitigation efforts remains limited, partly due to financial constraints and free-riding incentives. Existing studies often treat mitigation decisions in isolation, overlooking dynamic social interactions and potential policy interventions that might shape collective behavior. This study develops a game-theoretic model to investigate how cost sensitivity, homeownership tenure, and neighboring strategies influence homeowners’ wildfire mitigation decisions. Then, using a replicator dynamics framework, we further explore the conditions under which mitigation behavior either spread or collapse within a community, and how policy interventions can shift these dynamics toward greater collective action. Key findings include the following: (1) the analysis derives a critical subsidy threshold, beyond which collective mitigation becomes the socially optimal equilibrium; (2) early-stage seeding of mitigation behavior is essential to avoid convergence to inaction; and (3) policies that enhance perceived personal benefits are more effective than appeals to collective risk in promoting participation. These findings inform the design of behaviorally responsive subsidy policies to improve wildfire resilience in WUI areas.